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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between science and public discourse as an issue of interdisciplinarity. It asks 
three questions: can scientists speak to non-scientists in such a way that non-scientists truly understand what is 
being said; can there be a genuine transfer of knowledge between the two; and how fungible are the boundaries 
between science and public discourse? It argues that most people dealing with these questions are informed by an 
old model of communication — one that sees it in terms of moving messages from sender to receiver, not as social 
interaction. It questions whether there is, or indeed should be, an eager audience for scientific information. Finally, it 
suggests that only mandated scientists take up the challenge of communicating science to the public, but it notes that 
the efforts of mandated scientists in this regard are rarely endorsed by working scientists. By reconceiving 
communication, and emphasizing audience needs, one can answer the first two questions positively. But problems 
still remain in the relationship between working and mandated scientists, and these still pose a challenge for 
interdisciplinary research. 
 
Introduction 
As I look back on twenty years of literature on interdisciplinarity, I see that it has not grown 
large, but it represents a respectable collection of intellectually challenging work.1 Studies of 
interdisciplinarity will never be popular; they require too much introspection, and too many 
report cards on the work of one’s colleagues. They also involve too much meta-theory written 
by people with little academic interest in philosophy.2 Still, this literature suggests that 
disciplines each have their own register, and that disciplines operate as self-policing speech 
communities.3 Disciplines constitute their work according to conventions they themselves have 
developed, rendering some topics and methodologies marginal to the main thrust of their 
scholarly work.4 
Seen in this light, interdisciplinarity is an inevitable result of the organization of knowledge 
into disciplines represented quite neatly by university departments and faculties. 
Interdisciplinarity is nothing more or less than a challenge to the status quo. The challenge can 
take many forms: it can involve questioning the policing of disciplinary community 
boundaries,5 or disciplinarians' self-absorption with a small number of intellectual problems, or 
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any discipline’s obscure and occasionally arcane uses of language, or any discipline’s failure to 
deal with social problems. 
Meanwhile, the world outside the literature has also changed to the point where 
interdisciplinarity is now mainstream. For example, the Canadian research funding councils 
have made interdisciplinarity a prerequisite for some of their funding programs.6 To qualify for 
these grants, colleagues from different disciplines must prove they have viable working 
relationships with each other. Many large research projects must have non-academic partners. 
As well, interdisciplinary university departments and programs have been set up around such 
themes as communication, science policy, risk assessment, and cognitive science. Women’s 
Studies graduate degrees are now commonplace; the challenges now come from gays and 
lesbians. It would be hard to argue that academic writers caused all this to happen, but we have 
been here all along — prodding and pushing, providing intellectual rationales for initiatives 
that were usually made for political purposes rather than academic ones. 
With interdisciplinarity now firmly anchored in the intellectual landscape, the challenge 
that animated early writers has been quieted. This is not to say that nothing remains to be said. 
On the contrary, now that the basic contours of the landscape are known, it is possible to 
address more interesting questions about the “hows and whys” of interdisciplinarity. Questions 
about the founding presumptions of interdisciplinarity were mainly not addressed because our 
emphasis was on definitions, descriptions, typologies, and prescriptions. The task was to get the 
terminology right, defining “interdisciplinarity” and asking whether there is any difference 
between metadisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, and interdisciplinarity. Writers on 
interdisciplinarity constructed numerous typologies, as is always done in the early stages of an 
intellectual endeavour. They told others in the university and on funding councils what they 
should be doing. 
It is time to return to the original formulations in the literature, and ask the questions its 
authors, including myself, did not ask in their first round of exploration. For example, it would 
be worth asking now whether physicists and biologists understand science differently, and if so, 
what the implications of a genuine collaboration are for the content of their science. It would be 
worth systematically comparing “partnered” research with non-partnered research to see what 
impact, if any, the partnering has had on how science is done or written about. Do teams of 
researchers from different disciplines produce something different by virtue of their co-
operation, or are these research “teams” merely managerial arrangements? Which terminology 
is locked into a discipline, fundamental to how it constructs the main line of its research? Which 
terminology can be appropriated and properly used in an interdisciplinary endeavour? How 
significant are metaphors, which travel easily from discipline to interdiscipline, in rigorously 
conducted scientific work? The list of work yet to be done is long and challenging. 
This paper takes up one item from the list of new questions. It asks three questions: Can 
scholars speak to non-scholars in such a way that non-scholars can truly appreciate and actually 
use what they hear? Can there be a transfer of expertise between scientists and non-scientists? 
How fungible are the boundaries between scientific and public discourse? The early literature 
on interdisciplinarity was unequivocal in its response to these questions. Not only was it 
possible to transfer expertise, but also it was the duty of academics everywhere to do so — that 
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is, to communicate science to the public. This answer was good enough for its day, but it will 
not suffice now. 
The research granting councils in Canada now require academics to spend ten per cent of 
their research budgets on communicating their results to the public. This has proven a thankless 
task. Focused on the conduct and content of their research, researchers are hard pressed to 
identify who this public might be, and there is precious little guidance available. Academics 
know best how to talk to fellow academics and students. They are rarely good public 
communicators. Traces of the old disciplinary mentality remain even in the newest 
interdisciplines. A scholar who spends the majority of her time talking to the public, especially 
via the media, is suspect as a poor scholar. 
The result of all this so-called communicating-science-to-the-public has been (with a few 
notable exceptions) conferences and workshops to which government officials (and a few 
advocate group leaders) are invited. Reports have been written. Gray masses of text dissuade 
anyone from reading beyond the title page. Occasionally, these reports are peppered with clip-
art, cartoons, and decoration, in the manner of “academic research for dummies." Is this what 
the research councils had in mind? Who reads the reports? Who attends the workshops, and 
who cares? 
Meanwhile, many public-interest advocates claim that science is no longer properly only the 
prerogative of scientists.7 Public discourse about important issues, such as environmentalism, 
economic development, globalization, and the like, is shot through with something that 
approximates scientific debate, within which non-scientists are expected to play a major role. 
The tag-line “science is imbued with social values” is everywhere in evidence, giving license to 
non-scientists to comment upon even the most intimately scientific matters.8 Patience with 
purely academic discourse is possibly at an all-time low. 
Needless to say, there are brilliant science writers who turn complicated matters into 
language and concepts readily grasped by non-scientists. Their work is nothing new; great (and 
not so great) science writing accompanies modern science. And there are readers like my Aunt 
Flossie, whose curiosity drives them far beyond the limits of their formal education to become 
devotees of such writing. This is not where the granting councils thought they were spending 
their precious resources. Aunt Flossie is not their intended audience. Nor is Aunt Flossie one of 
the new non-experts who expect to play a role in public policy. The reason is simple. Aunt 
Flossie is a generalist. An article on physics is really no different to her than one on biology. She 
reads the brilliant science writers to expand her own horizons, to appreciate the complexities of 
the world around her. She would never think to speak about science being imbued with social 
values because she has no political use for the science she assimilates, now with relative ease. 
She is not challenging the expertise of scientists testifying before an environmental assessment 
board, nor is she launching a campaign against the impotence of science to deal with the 
matters she most cares about. To Aunt Flossie, science communication provides a window into 
a world that she feels privileged to access. She would not think of suggesting that science be 
differently oriented. 
In Canada at least, the research granting councils, academics, and public interest advocates 
all agreed: Science should not only be communicated, but it should also be reconfigured to deal 
with the kinds of questions scientists rarely had asked. Relevancy was the watchword of this 
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interdisciplinary challenge. The goal was not so much for everyone to understand (or even just 
to appreciate) science as it was to share scientific expertise, dissolving the seemingly 
impenetrable barriers between science and the public. The authority of science was no longer to 
be taken for granted. The formerly closeted community of scholars needed to earn it by 
interacting with a politically engaged public. Breaking down disciplinary borders meant 
bringing together not just sociologists and political scientists (hardly much of a challenge, as it 
turns out), but experts and non-experts in a single debate inside and outside the academy. 
No one thought it was going to be easy, this particular challenge of interdisciplinarity. But it 
is surprising how hard it has turned out to be. Today, the boundaries between science and 
public discourse are as contested as they ever were, and the results of all this science 
communication are paltry. Assuming there is a willing body of scientists (as there now is) and a 
public increasingly engaged with matters previously accorded to science (which there also is), 
what is it that gives rise to the difficulties? 
This is the question I will now address. I will not cover old ground in arguing for the 
relevance of science or the significance of public contributions to matters scientists have long 
held as their own. I take it for granted that increasing the connections between scientific and 
public discourse is worthwhile, perhaps even beneficial to science proper, and essential for a 
healthy public sphere. I want to move beyond the easy, prescriptive version of 
interdisciplinarity into the much messier issues that underlie boundary-making where the 
public is involved. 
I will make three arguments. First, most of those speaking about communicating science to 
the public are working with an out-of-date and impoverished model of communication, one 
hardly ever taken seriously within communication studies today. The old model saw a sender 
of information connected to a receiver of information by means of a message and medium. The 
flow of information was inherently one way, although allowance was made for feedback loops. 
Communication theory today places as much emphasis on the “reader” of information as on its 
author, and as much upon the context in which the communication occurs as on the message. It 
is also all about language and discourse. I will suggest that research granting councils and 
scientists need to take seriously this new version of communication theory. 
The second argument is that it is wrong to presume an eager audience for the information 
generated by researchers. Importance is no guarantee of anything, as far as members of the 
public and public discourse are concerned. The issue is not apathy, nor is it that members of the 
public lack the interest and intellectual skill to deal with matters of substance.9 On the contrary, 
matters of substance are dealt with all the time. The issue is instead that insiders to the academy 
and outsiders do not agree about what is important. Points of connection are missing. 
Communicators of science rarely take seriously the good reasons that members of the public 
have for relying on the information they already have.10 So, attention must be paid to the 
problem of audience. What does this public understand to be their information needs? When 
(and why) do they think they need information? 
The third argument is more directly focused on science. There are three fundamentally 
different notions of science at play in discussions about science and public discourse. Science in 
the realm of practicing scientists bears almost no resemblance to science understood as 
collections of interesting facts about the natural world, human health, and the like. It differs yet 
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again from what might be called mandated science,11 the science that accompanies both 
policymaking and public controversies. Mandated science, at its best, is interdisciplinary in the 
sense I am using it here. It is, or at least it can be, about sharing expertise, about relevancy, and 
about a relationship between science and public discourse. The problem is that mandated 
science and working science — that is, science as conventionally practiced in the academy — are 
hardly easy companions. Mandated science’s “differently oriented science” has almost no 
impact on working science. Moreover, the sensibilities of working science barely carry over to 
mandated science, with the result that many working scientists do not consider mandated 
science to be science at all. 
It is worth stating the obvious before proceeding with these arguments. Nothing precludes 
scientists from talking to non-scientists or vice versa. At this level of generality, achieving 
interdisciplinarity poses no special problems. It requires only time, resources, and an effective 
mode of translation so that the two speech communities can learn to share a common language 
for their conversation.12 To go beyond generality and seek a genuine and extended public 
discourse informed by science, and to want to see scientific work (in its turn) open to questions, 
insights, and demands from the public, means moving into a different territory. Understanding 
this kind of interdisciplinarity and getting it right in practice, will require rigorous attention to 
the particularities of this interaction, and a great deal of creativity. It will mean re-thinking the 
implications of communicating science to the public in every instance. 
This article is comprised of three mini-essays. Each can be read separately as a discussion of 
the problems of communicating science to the public. Each ends with something akin to 
recommendations. The three mini-essays can also be read together as a discussion of 
interdisciplinarity. Taken together, they answer the three questions posed here about the 
relationship of science and public discourse. 
The article is also based on two types of data that are very different from each other. The 
first and third mini-essays rest on academic studies that I have completed previously. I will 
provide only the briefest of summaries here; references are the guide to a more comprehensive 
view. The second argument, about information and audiences, is based on work done over the 
past five years by a community group called “Plainspeak.” Plainspeak works with public 
interest advocate groups and First Nations to make the information required for their decision-
making accessible, intelligible, and beautifully seductive. The goal is to get people to reach for, 
assimilate, and use the information they themselves say they need. Plainspeak writes "plain 
language,” but it focuses most of its efforts on community engagement and on information 
graphics. Plainspeak represents what is often called “action-research,”13 and this article 
represents my first attempt to synthesize its findings for an academic audience interested in 
interdisciplinarity. 
Finally, I have already spoken about “science,” “the public,” and “communicating science to 
the public” without yet defining my terms. I will use “science” throughout this article as a 
synonym for academic research, including research in the social sciences (and even in the 
humanities). The distinguishing feature of “science” for my purposes is its academic credibility. 
My use of “public” will become clear in the arguments I make below. “Communicating science 
to the public” refers to the interdisciplinary challenge of bringing science into a relationship 
with public discourse. 
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One: Information versus communication 
In the early days of communication theory — for example, when Lasswell14 made his first 
contributions — the model of communication was a simple one. It saw a sender and a receiver 
of information, and connected the sender and receiver by a message. From his close reading of 
Harold Innis, among others, James Carey added an important dimension to the model of 
communication, even while he critiqued its premises.15 The result was a more sophisticated 
model. The medium was not a neutral element in a system of communication, Carey said. The 
medium biased information as surely as do the personal opinions of the communicators. Added 
to the model, then, were multiple feedback loops — that is, ways in which the sender and the 
receiver might each intervene in the transmission of a message, changing the content of the 
message along the way. The old model became very versatile.  
To be sure, there were challenges to this orthodox version of communication theory,16 but 
the old model accommodated the more practical ones, and its proponents ignored the rest. 
Events outside the academy did not stand still, however. The development of machine-based 
communication spawned a whole new discipline (or was it an interdiscipline?) of information 
science, and from this even more interdisciplines, such as cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence. The old model of communication worked especially well in the new 
interdisciplines, given their emphasis on information and its increasingly complex modes of 
transmission. 
The success of the model for information science helped prod communication scholars to 
distinguish what they do from information science. After all, communication theory is only 
marginally about information.17 Its emphasis is on how communities of people establish sense 
and meaning from the experiences they have and from the language they use. Seen in this light, 
a lack of information (or silence) can be a message too. Moreover, communication theorists 
today believe that information does not readily translate into messages moving swiftly and 
intelligibly from sender to receiver. Power, class, race, and gender intervene. Identity matters. 
History tells in every interaction. Context provides meaning. At some point, communication 
theorists began to look away from information towards theories of language. Saussure, dead for 
many years, became the theorist to contend with. Foucault and Habermas, among others, 
moved to centre stage (for better or worse). 
It is absurd to speak of communication theory today as a single body of work, all driven by 
the same impetus and dependent upon the same conceptual models. Adherence to the ideas of 
one founding “father” or another has produced different strains of theory that can hardly be 
encompassed in a single volume, let alone in an article about an obscure topic like 
interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it is safe to say that communication theorists today take it 
as axiomatic that information is not the central concept to be explored. They speak instead 
about vershtenen — that is, understanding, sense-making, or discourse. In doing so, they shift 
the emphasis to the roles that social context, power relations, and audience alike play in shaping 
both the model and the content of communication. 
In my view, there are three main strains of thought within the corpus of modern 
communication theory, all somewhat related. In some senses, what separates their proponents 
is a matter of emphasis. One strain of theory takes its cue from early symbolic interactionism18 
to suggest that communication can best be understood as a process of sense-making. Both 
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individuals and social context are factored into this sense-making process; the focus of study is 
the points of interaction — that is, examining how shared conceptions of reality are constructed. 
Another strain of theory places greater emphasis on the social context — the ways in which 
historical, social, and contingent factors shape people’s understanding of what they 
experience.19 Here, the focus is not on individual communication so much as on frameworks of 
thought and action. Although theorists in this strain are concerned with the meaning that 
individuals take from their experience, they believe that such experience is always mediated by 
social context, so much so that research should focus on social context even to the exclusion of 
individual interactions. A third strain of theory puts more emphasis on language or, more 
properly, on discourse. Discourse is understood not as information being transmitted, but as the 
whole ethos of social and personal interchange made manifest through language.20 Discourse is 
deeply reflective of historical and social conditions, even while it shapes consciousness. 
The old model of communication saw the relationship between sender and receiver as a 
one-way street. When the old model was reformulated to take feedback into account in a 
meaningful way, this became a two-way street. Once the concept of discourse is introduced, the 
metaphor of street directions will no longer suffice. Discourse is bent and shaped in many 
directions all at once. It can be compared to the air we breathe. It lies outside the individual, but 
it is absorbed. It can be discerned in how individuals talk about and understand their world and 
their experience. Nothing can be presumed about the meaning of any particular sentence or 
interaction without appreciating how it is read (and experienced) by those who speak and hear 
it. No sentence stands on its own but, instead, all sentences are part of a long trajectory of 
concept-formation. 
The old model of communication lent itself easily to the task of communicating science to 
the public. Think of it this way. Scientists are the senders of messages; members of the public 
are the receivers. The message is the content of research. The mode of transmission is typically 
the conference, workshop, or report. In this formulation, communication can be stripped of its 
relationship to power, class, race, and anything interesting about identity. Indeed, no transfer of 
power is intended between sender and receiver — that is, between scientists and members of 
the public. It is simply presumed that scientists have something to say, by virtue of their 
expertise, and that members of the public have something to learn. As noted above, the old 
model is well suited (once further developed) to the interdisciplines of information science and 
artificial intelligence precisely because it deals with information as opposed to communication. 
It is also well suited to the sub-discipline of science education, inasmuch as it focuses on the 
core curriculum to be taught in the schools — that is, on the content of information to be 
transmitted to a captive audience.21 
The old model of communication is also very attractive to research funding councils and 
even to some researchers. They too are preoccupied with the content of information — their 
research findings, so to speak. Their presumption is that the audience for research outside the 
academy should come later, once the basic job of theory-critique-research is done and once the 
main issues have been resolved. Surrounded by a world that seems to worship information (the 
“information revolution” and all that), they easily confuse information with communication 
and believe that transmitting information is a relatively straightforward process once the 
techniques (even including PowerPoint) are known. 
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In my view, proponents of the new model of communication also have themselves to blame 
for the fact that most people outside the academy rely upon the old model. The new model is 
rich and complex — so rich and complex that even academically trained readers cannot read it 
easily. It is strewn with jargon of the most unintelligible kind, and with special words used in 
special ways.22 Reading communication theory today requires learning a foreign language, not 
so much French or German as “Foucault” and “Habermas.” One speaks “Baudrillard,” 
“Barthes,” and “Bakhtin,” not English. Continual reference is made to these and other founding 
“fathers,” even though few scholars have read their work. Everything is contested; every 
situation or fact is “constructed.” Every word carries an electric charge — that is, references to 
battles between and among proponents of one strain of theory or another. Long-established 
canons of academic discourse, argumentation, and even methodology have been thrust aside.23 
Little wonder, then, that few outside communication studies have picked up and used the new 
model of communication in their thinking about communicating science to the public. 
This is a serious problem, to say the least. How can there be forward movement in 
communicating science to the public if those who propose it are mired in inadequate notions of 
communication on one hand, and impenetrable debates on the other? Ironically, proponents of 
the new model of communication are far more likely to share the goal of “relevancy” than 
proponents of the old. Despite their many differences, almost all believe that expertise must be 
shared and that scientific and public discourse must take place on common ground. 
A translation is needed. For the purposes of this article, I will make the attempt. Let me 
begin this translation by noting something interesting. In the old model of communication, 
there is hardly a trace of sociology, even though its adherents often claim to be interdisciplinary 
in their approach and count sociology as one of the elements of an adequate interdisciplinarity. 
By contrast, the new model of communication is shot through with sociology (and linguistics). 
If I strip down the new model by outlining some of its basic elements, it will become obvious 
how sociology has now been factored in. It will become far less obscure. Its elements are as 
follows:  
First, any communicative relationship is a relationship. Its constituent elements cannot be 
studied properly apart from the relationship they make up. 
Second, as a crucial element in the relationship, the reader or audience must be factored in, 
not just as a source of feedback, but also as a founding partner in the relationship. 
Communication is an evolving dialogue between author and reader. Indeed, each participant is 
both author and reader. 
Third, information becomes meaningful only in context, and only when there are 
supporting cues (within the environment, between the parties, and especially within the 
discourse itself) to what is being said or heard. These cues frame interaction, and provide points 
of reference for it. 
Fourth, nothing is preordained about the directionality of interaction, since information 
moves back and forth, in and out, around and through relationships in ways that even their 
participants barely (if at all) recognize. 
Finally, all communication is based on language, and human language is shot through with 
symbolic and iconic elements. No utterance or gesture can be disconnected from the baggage it 
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carries: historical baggage, social baggage, psychological baggage, political baggage, and of 
course power relations.  
This is, as I just said, just plain sociology, but it will serve as a recipe for making today’s 
communication theory accessible to those who are neither sociologists nor communication 
theorists, and more importantly, to those who want to communicate science to the public. Let’s 
see how it works: 
First, attention must be paid to bringing scientists and the public into the same sphere, so 
that a relationship is possible. It cannot be presumed that either will get there on their own — 
that is, that scientists will leave the secure nest of the academy, or that members of the public 
will seek out science, putting aside all their own prejudices and predispositions. The point 
seems self-evident, almost tautological: there is no relationship without a relationship. 
Second, much more attention must be paid to the question of audience — that is, those who 
are founding members of the relationship. Who is this “public”? The question must be 
answered specifically, not in general. Which individuals can be imagined as participating fully 
in the relationship? 
Third, there is a need to figure out what would bring these members of the public into the 
relationship we want to foster. Under what conditions might members of the public want to 
reach out for scientific information? What is in this relationship for them? Information? Where 
do they usually get the information they use now? What good reasons do they have for relying 
on what they already know, and are there good reasons for them to seek change? 
Fourth, there is also a need to figure out what brings scientists into the relationship that we 
want to foster. Under what conditions do (or would) scientists reach out for interaction with the 
public, especially given all the disincentives in the academy for doing so? What is in this 
relationship for them? What information might properly come from members of the public to 
enrich scientific work? How can scientists factor in such information, given that it rarely takes 
the form of data they know how to handle? 
Fifth, I have been talking about sharing expertise, at least to the extent that it is needed and 
possible. There is a power dynamic in any relationship involving expertise. It revolves around 
the authority and privilege accorded to experts. Interestingly, the power dynamic does not stop 
there. It also revolves around the kinds of pressures that members of the public can bring to 
bear upon science, especially in the heat of public controversy. The power dynamic needs to be 
taken into account when talking about a relationship between science and public discourse. 
Sixth, there is a need to unpack the language of both science and public discourse. Again, 
translation is needed. Keep in mind that choice of language is not a matter solely of individual 
discretion, but always reflects social, historical, and political factors. There is a need to translate 
more than the words on the page, and to pay attention to the presumptions and ideas that lie 
behind them. The history of ideas and the substance of history must be factored in. 
 
Two: Making information important 
In the introduction to this article, I indicated that it is partly based on experience with 
Plainspeak, a non-profit organization founded with the mission of communicating complex 
information, such as information about science. Thus far, I have spoken mainly as an academic, 
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speaking to other academics in a language that should seem familiar. Let me add now a few 
stories from the trenches.24 
When Plainspeak was first set up, some five years ago, everyone said that there would be a 
line-up at the door, provided the job was done well. Plainspeak’s services were cheap by 
comparison with commercial graphics and plain language services. Its work was of 
demonstrably high quality. Members of the group had absorbed the lessons from Edward 
Tufte’s Envisioning Information25 well and were quite prepared to put them into practice. The 
group included senior academics and lawyers, so it could reasonably take command of the 
complex information it might be asked to deal with. And all of the group members had long-
standing relationships with First Nations and community groups — that is, credibility in the 
world of advocacy politics. 
Plainspeak has proven a hard sell (if this is the right term). Not only has there been no line-
up, but also this group has continually been asked to do something other than to fulfill the 
original mandate of Plainspeak. It has been asked to write fund-raising materials for advocacy 
groups, for example, and to assist in campaigns packaging persuasive rhetoric (about important 
issues, to be sure) for general consumption in the style of social marketing. It has rounded up 
lots of work, which it proudly displays on a website,26 but it has had limited success in getting 
many groups to focus on generating informed debate. Plainspeak set out to support informed 
public debate about complex issues by using its graphics and writing skills, and it has ended up 
mainly being called upon to do PR instead. Meanwhile, it has yet to be asked to create public 
dialogue about research findings. It has not even yet been asked to illustrate a report. 
This litany of difficulties should not disguise the successes that Plainspeak has had with 
groups who do want plainspeak, not PR. From both successes and failures, group members 
have learned the following: Plainspeak must be driven by need. That is, members of the public 
must have specific needs before they will reach for new information. A decision pending, a vote 
on an Aboriginal land claim settlement, a court decision affecting rights and benefits — these 
are instances where communication between experts and non-experts is desired, and thus 
becomes possible. 
In working with public interest advocates, the group has also learned that few of them pay 
much attention to their audience, although they certainly claim the opposite. They think of their 
audience in terms of “everyone,” but address no one in particular. Most of the work Plainspeak 
needs to do, well before anyone draws a sketch or writes a word, is bound up in discussions 
about the who, why, how, and when of the audience. 
I have no doubt that those communicating science to the public fall victim to the same 
problem. To the extent that they think of audience at all, they too think it is “everybody.” And 
because “everybody” is never available (indeed inaccessible, by definition), a crude substitution 
is performed. “Everybody” becomes government bureaucrats, corporation officials, and a 
sprinkling of advocate group leaders — a worthwhile audience to be sure, but hardly 
representative of public discourse. 
Back to Plainspeak. Assuming there is an answer to questions about audience, Plainspeak 
spends days asking questions about where and how these people get their information, and 
about the role that such information actually plays (and does not play) in their deliberations. 
Plainspeak tries to imagine someone actually glancing at or picking up something it produces, 
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taking the time to assimilate what is being said, interpreting for themselves what is on offer, 
and walking away somehow changed in the process. 
Long before Plainspeak was set up, I was sobered by a visit to a hospital waiting room. 
Wonderfully illustrated brochures sat in neat racks. They dealt with all aspects of health, and 
they offered genuine assistance, or so it seemed. They were written in many languages, and 
they showed brown faces as well as white ones, men and women, old and young, fit and fat 
alike. This was a hospital; surely here was an attentive public, at least as far as matters of health 
were concerned. In six hours, not one person so much as wandered over to the rack. Not one 
person picked up a brochure and scanned it. If I needed a lesson that important messages do 
not create or find their natural audiences, even in hospitable circumstances, I got it here. 
In truth, Aunt Flossie is rare. The eager audience for communication about research findings 
is a limited one.27 And even if it were not, communication about science addressed to her has a 
limited value from the perspective of “relevancy” of research. Remember, I am talking about 
sharing expertise, while Aunt Flossie’s interest is only in appreciating what science can 
produce. For this purpose, no one can assume a willing audience. 
There is a marvelous self-discipline to this exercise of audience-determination. That is, 
thinking about who might actually use the information, and under what conditions, is 
tremendously useful. It sharpens the research focus. It improves the writing. It generates 
metaphors. It calls to mind examples. It enriches theory with good stories. It forces writers to 
step outside the bounds of specialized language and to explain concepts in ways that outsiders 
to their intimate circle of colleagues can understand. 
Only when it is clear who the audience is intended to be (where it currently gets its 
information, what it thinks it needs in terms of new information, etc.) is it possible to devise 
communication strategies. Instead of reaching automatically for the report and the PowerPoint 
slides, it is possible to think creatively about which medium to use. This is what is meant by 
communications strategy. What media would such people encounter in the routine of their 
daily lives? What might cause these particular people to pause long enough to scan what is on 
offer? How much can these particular people assimilate at first glance, and what needs to be 
saved for later? How can this information be saved in a form that is useful later? Are these 
people Internet users or not? 
Answering these questions has dramatic results. Gone are the long grey reports illustrated 
by clip art that is incompatible in style and content with what is being said. Gone are the glossy 
brochures with too little information to be useful. Gone are most video and short educational 
films, because no one goes home at the end of a long day’s work, turns on the video recorder, 
and plugs in an educational video. Gone are conferences and workshops for people we already 
know — gatherings of insiders designed for other insiders. Gone is tokenism — invitations 
extended to particular outsiders in the hope that they represent designated groups within the 
public. 
No one can say in advance what replaces the almost useless products of contemporary 
efforts to communicate the results of scientific research to the public. The answers always come 
from the initial exercise of thinking hard about the intended audience. 
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Three: The many faces of science 
I have been talking about refashioning communication of science28 to the public as a means of 
embracing true interdisciplinarity. Thus far, I have concentrated mainly on communication. I 
have suggested that the old model of communication (sender/receiver/message/feedback) needs 
to be put aside and replaced with insights from today’s communication theory. Today’s 
communication theorists are less helpful in this task than they should be, so I have attempted a 
crude translation, identifying the basic elements of a new model of communication. 
I have also spoken briefly about the “public.” In doing so, I performed a sleight of hand; I 
have substituted “audience” for the notion of the public. In other words, instead of speaking 
broadly about public discourse, I have drawn attention to the specific individuals who might 
be, given the right circumstances, brought into a relationship with science. Seen in this light, 
public discourse becomes a pragmatic concept. I am thinking about identifiable members of the 
public, who inhabit real lives and have real needs. These people sometimes need new 
information, but they already get by quite well with what they have. Such people come into 
contact with new information in some locations, but not others, and routinely pay attention to 
some media, but not others. 
In dealing with science, I propose a similar sleight of hand. I propose to treat scientific 
discourse in a very practical way. Needless to say, my discussion will not put to rest the larger 
questions raised in sociology and philosophy of science about the relationship between science 
and public discourse. I leave these larger questions to other writers on interdisciplinarity. 
Pragmatically, science operates in three distinct realms.29 The first is familiar to anyone who 
has watched Discovery Channel on television, or browsed the shelves of a local bookstore. Call 
this realm of science, for lack of a better term, discovery science. At one extreme, discovery 
science shades into self-help manuals, where facts (from science or not) spawn advice for living. 
At the other extreme, discovery science shades into scientific treatises, in the manner of Stephen 
Hawking’s books. Hawking notwithstanding, observation drives most discovery science. 
Natural phenomena are described and explained. Facts are the purpose of science. Scientists are 
authority figures, responsible for making the observations and producing the facts. The 
audience for discovery science is Aunt Flossie and her many less intellectually rigorous nieces 
and nephews. 
The second realm of science is that of working science.30 This is the science of the academy, of 
disciplines, and of serious research and scholarship. It is best reflected in journals, where 
articles have been peer-reviewed, and where academic debates centre on seemingly arcane 
arguments about theories and research findings. Findings in such journals seldom have direct 
relevance (at least in the first instance) to anyone other than working scientists. Narrow in its 
focus, working science often uses models, simulations, statistical indicators, and theoretical 
constructs. It rarely deals in plain facts. Indeed, working science is characterized by its 
preoccupation with uncertainty and probability: debate is endemic; conflict is commonplace. 
Working scientists must be properly trained and qualified. Training ensures that scientists 
fully appreciate the nuances and subtleties of the words on the pages of scientific reports. To 
appreciate what is really being said, working scientists must be intimate with the trajectory of 
research that supports their research findings. 
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The third realm of science is mandated science — that is, science closely aligned with public 
policy decisions. Mandated science is much more narrowly construed than working science. Its 
goal is to conduct research or interpret scientific studies for public purposes. Its primary 
audience is advocate groups, government officials, company spokespersons, and regulators, not 
working scientists. 
Mandated science may be narrowly construed as far as its intended audience is concerned, 
but it is often broad and interdisciplinary with respect to the subjects it deals with, and 
polymorphous in terms of its methods of research. In academe, mandated science is sometimes 
labeled “strategic research,” and teams of researchers working with non-academic partners 
commonly conduct it. All mandated science is infused with social values, and explicitly so, even 
if some mandated scientists take care not to let such values bias the conduct of their work. 
At one extreme of mandated science, there is little difference between it and discovery 
science. Facts churned up to assist policy-makers find their way onto the bookshelves of the 
local bookstore and into the self-help guides. At the other extreme, mandated science can barely 
be distinguished from working science. That said, mandated science is different from working 
science only because of the wide lens it applies to research, and the willingness of its 
practitioners to engage in public discourse. 
In this article, there is no need to deal with the relationship between these three realms of 
science. Suffice to say here that they are very different from each other, and that these 
differences bear examination. Here the focus is communicating science to the public, not in the 
conventional sense of educating the public about science, but in the interdisciplinary sense of 
developing relationships between science and public discourse based on shared expertise. A 
comparison between the three realms of science is in order, as are comments about the 
relationships among them. 
As noted earlier, discovery science is all about communicating science to the public. It offers 
a picture window view upon science and a distillation of scientific findings in a format readily 
assimilated by non-experts. Theoretically, members of the public who follow discovery science 
will be better attuned to what working science has to offer, having developed an appreciation 
for what scientists actually do and how they do it. They will be less likely to misread science 
when it is reported in the newspaper if they follow discovery science. They will exercise 
informed judgements about claims being made in the name of science, especially in public 
controversies. In discovery science, however, little effort is made to dislodge the authority of 
science or scientists. On the contrary, discovery science is about instilling admiration and 
respect for science. It is not intended as an exercise in sharing expertise. 
Working science is not about communicating science to the public (despite all the talk about 
communicating research findings to the public). Indeed, working scientists presume the 
opposite: they presume that a great gulf should exist between what scientists do and how 
science is spoken about in public discourse. While a few working scientists endorse the idea of 
“relevancy,” all working scientists shape their research agendas with reference to the academic 
literature and on the basis of their discussions with other working scientists, not on the basis of 
public discourse. Working scientists believe that proper qualifications and expertise are 
required before anyone can truly understand the implications of any particular piece of 
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research. In other words, in working science, it is presumed that expertise cannot be shared and 
that scientific discourse and public discourse are fundamentally different. 
As a result of this, there is a natural affinity between discovery science and working science. 
They can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Working science produces the research; 
discovery science packages data from working science so that a non-expert public can easily 
assimilate them. Discovery science also produces an appreciative audience and supportive 
atmosphere for working science. Public recognition and increased financing for working science 
should result. Indeed, one rationale for communicating science to the public is that such 
communication makes it possible for working scientists to garner support (and thus funding) 
from politicians.31 
Mandated science is something quite different. Mandated science is all about 
communication. From the perspective of policy makers, it is about creating a variant of science 
that is compatible with their needs. In this context, mandated scientists act as translators of 
working science, providing evaluation and status reports in support of recommendations for 
policy. From the perspective of the public involved in controversies about public policy, 
mandated science represents the fusion of science with social values. Because of this, mandated 
science can be used by expert witnesses in regulatory or environmental hearings, in support of 
campaigns for more enlightened public policy, or even to launch radical critiques (say, deep 
ecology and the like). 
In some senses, then, mandated science represents the interdisciplinarian’s dream come 
true. Here is science that is truly fused with public discourse. Mandated science even needs 
public contributions, because it includes discussion about social values. Members of the public 
are experts on social values, both their own and those of others. 
Entering the debate about public issues, policy makers and members of the public alike can 
learn to read mandated science properly. Once they have understood what mandated scientists 
have to say about the scientific underpinnings of global warming, genetically modified foods, or 
geological formations affecting hydro dam sites, they can cite science credibly, almost as if they 
themselves were scientists. The barriers between experts and non-experts, while not fully 
dissolved, become much less important. 
All should be well, but it is not. The most difficult challenge of interdisciplinarity would be 
met, were it not for the significant gulf between mandated science and working science. After 
all, the promise of mandated science is that it encompasses credible science, finding ways to 
make working science amenable to a close relationship between scientific discourse and public 
discourse. If, however, mandated science is not regarded as credible science, a necessary 
element in the relationship between scientific discourse and public discourse — that is, 
credibility — is missing. 
Why would mandated science not be credible as science? There are many reasons. Science is 
supposed to be internally driven and self-regulated, but mandated science responds to 
demands from policy makers and advocates. Working scientists make it a point to address their 
colleagues in the first instance, and the public and the media only after the main controversies 
have been settled. Mandated science is public in the first instance, and none of its participants 
would have it otherwise. Mandated science claims to be more democratic than working science. 
Working science never made any claim to being democratic in the first place. Mandated science 
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makes explicit the links between science and social values, even if care is taken by some 
mandated scientists to protect their research from bias. Working scientists rarely speak about 
their work as being objective or value-free when they meet among themselves, but very few of 
them would be prepared to engage in a discussion about the role of social values in science. 
Mandated scientists tackle broader topics than most working scientists, embracing 
interdisciplinarity in creating new fields of study and new working relationships between 
established disciplines. Working science pays attention to problems identified in debates within 
disciplinary journals. Because mandated science deals with policy, it is often surrounded by, 
and indeed also a participant in, public controversies. Working science avoids heat where 
possible, having enough conflict within science to keep it in action. Mandated science tends to 
produce predictable and polarized debates; these are seen as having no place in working 
science. Mandated science is accused of being science for hire. Working science avoids the 
courtroom at all costs. 
This list goes on and on. It hardly matters that some mandated science is conducted 
according to the strictest canons of science. It does not even matter that the funding councils in 
Canada and elsewhere have embraced mandated science by allocating a major portion of their 
funds to “strategic” and interdisciplinary research, and requiring partnerships with non-
experts. It does not matter that Royal Society reports are carefully constructed to be both 
scientific reports and reports to the public.32 The relationship between mandated and working 
science remains uneasy, with many working scientists being prepared to dismiss mandated 
science out of hand. 
So does it matter that working scientists often regard mandated science with suspicion? 
Given the choice, who would not want science infused with democracy? Experimenting with 
new methodologies should be a good thing, a sign that scientists can break free from old 
conventions and still produce peer- reviewed publications in highly reputable journals. Surely 
one would want to know what scientists have found out before making public policy decisions. 
That much of mandated science occurs within the academy, in new interdisciplinary 
departments and programs, should be cause for celebration. 
And so it is. But two worries remain. The first I have already dealt with at some length. 
Mandated science generally operates in a different sphere than working science, with precious 
little communication between the two. The interdisciplinary challenge has indeed produced a 
“differently-oriented” science, as I suggested earlier was its goal. But it has done so by creating 
a new stream of work outside the boundaries of working science — a body of work subject to its 
own rules and conventions. 
Second, I have been mainly speaking about the most carefully constructed research within 
the broad corpus of mandated science. There are lots of examples of mandated science that 
involve much less rigorous research. They also go by the name of “science.” There are also 
many instances where value debates drown out anything that science might contribute. Here, 
mandated science retains the label “science,” but it is really just advocacy. Furthermore, 
mandated science is dragged into all kinds of forums where neither scientific methods nor 
working scientists are respected. The quality of “scientific debate” in most courtrooms, policy 
briefing sessions, and public controversies leaves much to be desired. It hardly qualifies as 
science at all. To an outsider, it has the look of science, but it would never pass muster in the 
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peer-reviewed journals of reputable science. In short, despite the exceptions, it would be hard to 
claim that mandated science reflects a merger between the best that working science has to offer 
and public discourse. 
In the end, I am stuck with a stubborn contradiction. Through mandated science, 
communicating-science-to-the-public has finally reached the point where it represents a viable 
option, yet working science remains largely unchanged and unchallenged. The 
interdisciplinarity that I have been speaking about here has been achieved, but only at the cost 
of creating a separate sphere of research-related activity that can only sometimes claim 
credibility as science. In making science more compatible with public discourse, something 
important may have been lost along the way. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper proposed three questions. It is time to bring together the three very different strains 
of analysis within it to answer these questions. 
The first question is whether scientists can speak to non-scientists. The answer is a qualified 
yes. Scientists generally speak to non-scientists through the intermediaries of science writers 
and discovery science. Asking working scientists to communicate their research findings to the 
public without such translators is probably an exercise in futility. With these translators, of 
course, anything is possible. At best, they know how to transcend the limits of the old model of 
communication and how to create the illusion, if not the fact, of a relationship between science 
and public discourse. They know all about identifying audiences and responding to needs. 
The second question is whether there can be a transfer of expertise from science to the 
public. This answer is even more qualified. Working science has resisted (and will continue to 
resist) the interdisciplinary challenge. It has no place for the public and its concerns, except as 
an appreciative audience for what science produces. Mandated science does presume that 
transfer of expertise is possible and desirable, but it is beset with its own limitations, not the 
least of which is its lack of credibility with working scientists. 
However, even mandated science cannot take its relationship to the public for granted. Far 
too often, mandated scientists also adhere to the old model of communication, presuming they 
are communicating their research findings to the public, and that there is a ready and willing 
audience waiting for new information. Much attention is paid to the relationship between 
science and public discourse, but little is done to create this relationship and to bring all the 
necessary elements into it, including good science, to meet the real needs of specific people. 
Information is deemed important enough in its own right to attract an audience — the right 
audience of policy makers and members of the public. The relationship so central to mandated 
science — its interdisciplinary ethos — is often stillborn, due to bad science, thoughtless public 
advocacy, over-estimation of the power of information, and poor understandings of 
communication. 
The third question is the toughest to answer. Can the boundaries of science be made 
fungible to public discourse? I am speaking about working science here. So far, the prognosis is 
poor. Those who are most needed to make it happen — that is, working scientists — are not 
involved at all. Those who are most enthusiastic are still outsiders, despite their serious and 
sustained efforts. 
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So much has changed in the last twenty years, and yet this last interdisciplinary challenge 
remains on the agenda of work to be done. 
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